By Terence Cuneo
Antirealist perspectives approximately morality declare that ethical evidence or truths don't exist. Does this suggest that different varieties of normative evidence, corresponding to epistemic evidence, don't exist? The Normative Web develops a favorable solution to this query. Terence Cuneo argues that ethical and epistemic proof are sufficiently related in order that, if ethical evidence don't exist, then epistemic proof don't exist. yet epistemic proof do exist: to disclaim their lifestyles might dedicate us to an severe model of epistemological scepticism. hence, Cuneo concludes, ethical proof do exist. And if ethical evidence exist, then ethical realism is correct. it's occasionally acknowledged that ethical realists not often supply arguments for his or her place, settling in its place for mere defenses of a view they locate intuitively believable. against this, The Normative Web offers now not in simple terms a safety of sturdy realism in ethics, yet a favorable argument for this place. In so doing, it engages with various antirealist positions in epistemology comparable to mistakes theories, expressivist perspectives, and reductionist perspectives of epistemic purposes. those positions, Cuneo claims, come at a prohibitively excessive theoretical expense. Given this price, it follows that realism approximately either epistemic and ethical proof is a place that we must always locate hugely appealing.
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Antirealist perspectives approximately morality declare that ethical evidence or truths don't exist. Does this suggest that different varieties of normative evidence, comparable to epistemic proof, don't exist? The Normative net develops a good resolution to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that ethical and epistemic proof are sufficiently related in order that, if ethical proof don't exist, then epistemic proof don't exist.
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Additional info for The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism
As the statement of the core argument I offered in the Introduction will have indicated, this is precisely the strategy I will employ in what follows. In any case, for ease of exposition, I will use the term ‘moral antirealist’ to stand for any view that rejects The Moral Realist’s Ontic Thesis. But I should emphasize that any such view is best understood to be antirealist only in the sense that it rejects a fundamental tenet of paradigmatic moral realism. IV. What paradigmatic moral realism is not The three claims that comprise paradigmatic moral realism, I have claimed, form a package in which the ontic thesis enjoys a certain pride of place.
The ontic thesis lies at the heart of moral realism of the type I wish to defend. It is also the least perspicuous of the realist’s claims. The main problem here is that ‘reduction’ talk is notoriously slippery in contemporary philosophy. So, I need to say just how I am using it. ¹⁶ Reductionism My use of the term ‘irreducibly exist’ is borrowed from longstanding debates between metaphysical realists and antirealists. Roughly, the idea is this: Suppose we think of metaphysical antirealist views concerning entities of kind K as falling into two basic types.
The second implication is that so-called deﬂationary accounts of moral discourse are not compatible with the realist’s speech act thesis. For present purposes, we can understand ‘assertoric deﬂationism’ to be comprised of the following two claims: First, a sentence p is assertible if p displays syntax of such a type that it fulﬁlls certain grammatical and logical roles—roles such ⁷ The exact sense of ‘purports’, as it is used here and in similar contexts, is difﬁcult to identify. For more on the matter, see Quine (1960) and Wolterstorff (1970), Ch.
The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism by Terence Cuneo